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based on individuals who think in a life cycle context with perfect foresight, full information, 
and in a time-consistent manner. This paper sheds light on selected aspects of pension 
economics when these assumptions do not hold. We focus on three aspects which are 
particularly relevant for the quickly aging Asian economies: the volume of savings for old-age 
provisions, international diversification of retirement savings, and global spillover effects of 
pension reforms. 
 
Keywords: Population aging, social security, life-cycle saving, public insurance, pension 
reform, retirement age. 
 
JEL Classification: C68, D91, E21, F21, H55, J11, J26 
 
 
ADBI Working Paper 708 Börsch-Supan, Härtl, and Leite 
 
Contents 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1 
2. SAVING BEHAVIOR WITH TIME-INCONSISTENT HOUSEHOLDS ......................... 3 
2.1 A Generalized Model of Household Behavior ................................................. 4 
2.2 Saving and Welfare when a Proportion of Households is Myopic ................... 5 
2.3 Saving and Welfare when Households are Procrastinating ............................ 6 
3. DIVERSIFICATION OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS WHEN HOUSEHOLDS  
ARE TIME-INCONSISTENT ...................................................................................... 9 
3.1 Model Structure ........................................................................................... 10 
3.2 Conventional Model of Time-consistent Households .................................... 14 
3.3 International Diversification when Households are Present-biased .............. 17 
4. GLOBAL SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF PENSION AND LABOR  
MARKET REFORM ................................................................................................. 23 
4.1 Effects on Europe ........................................................................................ 24 
4.2 Effects on Asia ............................................................................................. 24 
5. CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................................................... 28 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 29 
 
 
 
ADBI Working Paper 708 Börsch-Supan, Härtl, and Leite 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The uncertain future of public and private pension systems is a topic of high priority and 
large controversy. The pressures on pension systems are particularly pronounced in 
Asia and Europe—in Europe, because the number of retirees per number of workers is 
already very high and still increasing until about 2050, and in Asia, because the speed 
of population aging is so fast. This strain will affect all types of pension systems, 
whether they are pay-as-you-go (PAYG), fully funded (FF), defined benefit (DB), or 
defined contribution (DC), albeit to a different extent. 
Figure 1 shows the support ratio – the number of individual in working age, here 
defined as ages 15–64, divided by total population size—for four countries/country 
groups. Japan features the most progressed aging process in the world and has a 
large PAYG-financed public pension system. EU3 denotes the three largest countries 
of Continental Europe—France, Germany, and Italy. These countries have also 
substantially aged and have similarly large public PAYG pension systems as Japan. In 
turn, the United States (US) has a much smaller Social Security system and a  
much less pronounced population aging process. Finally, Asia2 denotes the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and India, which have very small pension systems, are still 
young but will face a very fast aging process in the future. After 2050, the Asia2 
countries will actually have a lower support ratio than the US. 
Figure 1: Support Ratio in the US, EU, and Asia 
 
US = United States, EU = European Union. 
Source: EU3 and US: Human Mortality Database. Japan and Asia2: UN Population Trends. Support 
ratio is population age 15–64 divided by total population size. 
A large number of older individuals per working age population in a country exerts 
pressures on the economy of this country since pension expenditures demand a  
high share of gross domestic product (GDP). The alignment between the extent of 
population aging and pension expenditures, however, is far from perfect (Figure 2). 
Most European countries have pension expenditures significantly above the regression 
line (Italy, Austria, France, Poland), while most Asian countries have much smaller 
pension systems relative to their demographic status (Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Australia, New Zealand). This is mainly due to the many design differences between 
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national pension systems. These design differences have strong implications for the 
impact of population aging on pension expenditures. 
Figure 2: Pension Expenditures (% of GDP) by Old-Age Dependency Ratio 
 
GDP = gross domestic product; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.  
Source: OECD Pensions at a glance (2015). Old-age dependency ratio is population age 65+ divided by population age 
15–64 (2013 data). Public and private pension expenditures are share of GDP (2012 data). 
Pension economics has traditionally guided pension policy with the help of formal 
models based on individuals who think in a life cycle context with perfect foresight, full 
information, and in a time-consistent manner. Opinions among citizens, however, range 
from complete ignorance about how serious the challenges are to the equally faulty 
belief that pension systems are doomed to completely fail (Boeri et al. 2001, 2002; 
Walker et al. 2014). 
This paper sheds light on selected aspects of pension economics and pension policy 
when the traditional assumptions do not hold. We focus on three aspects that are 
particularly relevant for the quickly aging Asian economies: the volume of savings  
for old-age provisions (Section 2), international diversification of retirement savings 
(Section 3), and global spillover effects of pension reforms (Section 4).  
Section 5 summarizes our main conclusions. First, and not surprisingly, the volume of 
savings for old-age provision is substantially lower in a world with many myopic 
households. This has repercussions on the interest rate and economic growth but also 
on the relative merits of pay-as-you-go versus fully funded pension systems. Second, 
international capital flows are substantially lower when households are present-biased 
since they are saving dramatically less. Third, parametric pension reforms in one part 
of the world will have global spillover effects. Changes in key labor market parameters, 
especially retirement age, in Europe also improve the sustainability of pension systems 
and economic growth in Asia. 
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2. SAVING BEHAVIOR WITH TIME-INCONSISTENT 
HOUSEHOLDS 
Pension systems and individual saving behavior strongly interact. On the one hand, the 
provision of social insurance reduces risks for households which may be hard or even 
impossible to cover on an individual basis. On the other hand, it reduces the need for 
private saving in order to provide old-age consumption and may thus reduce the level 
of productive capital in an economy. Population aging tends to sharpen this trade-off. 
Traditional economics has modelled these trade-offs using the neoclassical model of 
the saving and consumption decisions of a household over its life course under the 
assumption of perfectly foresighted life-cycle planners. In this paper, we will take a 
radically different point of view in assuming that households fail to plan ahead. This 
fundamentally changes the trade-off and how it is affected by population aging. Which 
set of assumptions best describes reality and what should therefore be the foundation 
for pension system design decisions is at the core of some key controversies among 
economists interested in saving behavior and social insurance. 
The typical life-cycle model has been used in the path-breaking general equilibrium 
models which have analyzed the effects of population aging on pension systems 
(Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987; Feldstein and Samwick 1998). This textbook case may 
also be interpreted as a parable for decision making if households have subscribed  
to a perfect commitment device which nudges them into a perfectly time-consistent 
consumption and labor supply behavior (Rabin, 2013a; b). It has two strong 
predictions: perfect consumption smoothing over the life cycle and perfect substitution 
between pension benefits and private savings. Regarding perfect consumption 
smoothing, while Banks et al. (1998); Battistin et al. (2009); Bernheim et al. (2001); and 
Haider and Stephens (2007) report a sharp and sudden consumption decline after 
retirement in many countries (the “retirement consumption puzzle”), the continuation  
of active saving after retirement in many countries, especially Germany, Italy, and 
Japan, is harder to explain with conventional models (the “German saving puzzle,” 
Börsch–Supan et al. 2001; De Nardi et al. 2010; Rohwedder et al. 2006). 
Concerning the perfect substitution between a PAYG system and private saving, one 
can observe in many countries a widespread failure to provide sufficiently early and 
consistently for retirement income in the sense that such saving is sufficient to  
offset actual and future benefit cuts (we refer to this as “filling the pension gap”: 
Börsch–Supan et al. (2015); Börsch–Supan et al. (2016a) for Germany; Knoef et al. 
(2016) for The Netherlands; and Crawford and O’Dea (2012) for the UK). In the US, 
such under-saving for retirement has received widespread attention (Poterba et al. 
2012; Repetto et al. 1998; Madrian and Shea 2001).  
Under a different perspective, Börsch–Supan et al. (2016b) have conducted an Internet 
survey among individuals aged 60 and older, which shows a substantial prevalence  
of regret over previous saving decisions. Of those who responded 60% wished that 
they had saved more when they were younger. This goes against the assumption of 
time-consistent carefully planning individuals. High demand for commitment devices, 
even when they are costly, provides more evidence to support this finding (Ashraf et al. 
2006; Beshears et al. 2011). 
In order to tackle this evidence, several strands in the literature emerged. While a first 
strand advocates that PAYG systems should be replaced by FF systems, a second 
strand enriches the neoclassical textbook model of time-consistent households by 
elements that justify the existence of a public pension system. Such elements include 
poverty alleviation and longevity risks (Börsch–Supan, Härtl, and Leite 2016), income 
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risks, market failures and information costs (Chan and Stevens 2008; Bucher–Koenen 
and Lusardi 2011; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011, 2014; Lusardi et al. 2013).  
This paper focusses on a third level of research which more radically replaces the 
neoclassical paradigm with models of imperfectly foresighted behavior. There are 
several avenues to model imperfect household decisions, such as myopia, present 
bias, and procrastination, each of which carries different implications for social 
insurance and population aging. These modeling approaches are by no means new but 
have only recently found widespread attention when they were applied to retirement 
saving in the US (Laibson 1997, 1998; Madrian and Shea 2001). The underlying 
behaviors have major implications for the design of pension systems and their 
interaction with population aging. Being the result of aggregate private savings 
decisions, capital flows are also strongly influenced by imperfect household decisions, 
which will be examined in Sections 3 and 4. 
2.1 A Generalized Model of Household Behavior 
A first and very simple way to model the failure to plan ahead is to extend the 
neoclassical model by assuming that welfare evaluation is still following a time-
consistent perfect-foresight program although the actual decision function is subjected 
to individual shortsightedness. Household i at time t receives utility from consumption 
ct,j and leisure 1-lt,j where lt,j is the time spent working. The most conventional 
specification is a per-period utility function given by 
( )( )11, , , ,1( ,1 )    11t j t j t j t ju c l c l
θϕϕ
θ
−−
− = ⋅ −
−
, (1) 
where risk aversion and intertemporal substitution are jointly described by the single 
parameter  θ while φ denotes the utility weight of consumption versus leisure. The 
household solves a utility maximization program over the entire life-cycle, such that the 
maximization problem of a cohort born in period t at j=0 is given by  
( ) ( ),0 ,0 , , ,
1
max ,1        ,1 .
J
j
t t t j j t j j t j j
j
u c l u c lδ β σ + + +
=
 
− + − 
 
∑   (2) 
There are three different elements of discounting the future utility from consumption 
and leisure. First, β represents the pure time discount factor:  
β = 1/(1+ρ).  (3) 
Second, households discount future utility with their unconditional survival probability 
σt,j, expressing the uncertainty about the time of death.  
Third, the parameter 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1 defines the degree of shortsightedness or present bias. 
At one extreme, δ = 0. In this case, the household is totally myopic and disregards all 
future utility. At the other extreme, δ = 1, we are back to the neoclassical model of time-
consistent behavior. In the intermediate cases, future utility is discounted more than 
exponentially relative to present utility. 
We do not include intended bequests in our model and assume that accidental 
bequests resulting from premature death are taxed away by the government at a 
confiscatory rate and used for otherwise neutral government consumption. 
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Households earn an age-specific labor income lt,j wt,j until retirement age R (where wt,j 
denotes the hourly wage) and may then receive a public pension pt,j which is financed 
by a contribution proportional to the labor income at rate τt. Hence, current disposable 
non-asset income yt,j is 
( ) ( ), , , ,1 1 ,t j t j t j t t jy l w pλ τ λ= ⋅ ⋅ − + − ⋅   (4) 
where λ=1 for j=0,…,R and λ=0 for j≥R+1. 
Denoting total assets by at,j, maximization of the household’s intertemporal utility is 
subject to a dynamic budget constraint given by 
( )1, 1 , , ,1  .t j t j t t j t ja a r y c+ + = + + −   (5) 
In some specifications, we will add a borrowing constraint 
at,j ≥ 0,  (6) 
which is typically binding at the beginning of the economic life but also prevents 
borrowing against pension income.  
In the extreme case of complete myopia, households focus on current utility only and 
ignore future utility. They therefore do not anticipate retirement and do not save. 
Without a pension system, they would suffer from starvation once deteriorating health 
forces them to retire. A mandatory pension system, whether PAYG or FF, DB or DC, 
thus has large beneficial effects. As opposed to the life-cycle model, a mandatory 
pension system has no negative incentive effects in this model (e.g., crowding out and 
moral hazard) since these myopic households would not save under any circumstance. 
Population aging will increase the financial volume of the pension system but there are 
no policy implications to be drawn as preventing starvation is indispensable. This 
arguably extreme example shows that welfare and policy implications are radically 
different from the perfect-foresight case. 
2.2 Saving and Welfare when a Proportion of Households  
is Myopic 
Total myopia is an extreme case in the aggregate. More realistically, different degrees 
of myopia prevail among households. Models with heterogeneous households are 
instructive because they show the trade-off between social protection and economic 
efficiency. By following Feldstein (1985), Börsch–Supan, Härtl, and Leite (2016)  
have shown that different degrees of myopia imply different life cycle consumption 
paths. They model a population which has two types of households. A fraction 𝜂 of 
households are myopic (M) with 𝛿 𝜖 [0,1). The other households have perfect foresight 
(denoted by PF). While a PAYG-DB pension system is clearly beneficial for the  
M-households, this is different for the PF-households because they have to co-finance 
the M-households’ pensions which reduces their utility. Moreover, the PAYG-DB 
system will crowd out private saving which may earn a higher rate of return. 
As Börsch–Supan, Härtl, and Leite (2016) show, the higher the percentage of  
PF-households, the lower the consumption at the beginning of life, and the higher the 
consumption at middle age until late stages of life since PF-households prefer to 
postpone consumption and enjoy higher utility later in life. The crowding-out effects are 
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clearly visible. If r is larger than the internal rate of return (irr) in the PAYG pension 
system, this reduces economic efficiency. 
The beneficial effect of a PAYG-DB pension system depends on 𝜂 and the difference 
between r and irr. In order to measure the impact of different combinations of irr in the 
PAYG-DB on welfare, Börsch–Supan, Härtl, and Leite (2016) apply consumption 
equivalent variation relative to a PAYG-DB system with an internal rate of return of 3%. 
Taking as a benchmark case a PAYG-DB system with an internal rate of return of 3%, 
if the share of myopic households is relatively large, a mandatory PAYG-DB system is 
always beneficial, even for low internal rates of return. In the extreme case in which all 
households are myopic, the lack of a pension system implies starvation at old  
age. Hence, all old-age consumption has to be provided to make these households as 
well off as in the benchmark case. The opposite extreme, when all households have 
perfect foresight, reflects the advantages of the annuitization provided by a PAYG-DB 
system relative to the pure saving case when the internal rate of return equals the 
market interest rate. This is not the case for a PAYG-DB system with lower internal 
rates of return. 
2.3 Saving and Welfare when Households are Procrastinating 
In contrast to myopia, another failure of the life-cycle model in describing reality may be 
that households have self-control problems. This time-inconsistent behavior has been 
subject of research of many studies (Thaler 1994; Laibson 1997, 1998; Angeletos et al. 
2001; Choi et al. 2002; Rabin 2013a, b; Della Vigna and Malmendier 2006). The 
assumption relies on the idea that households plan according to the life-cycle model 
but then fail to execute their plan, e.g., by putting off the decision to set up and pay into 
a retirement savings account.  
Strotz (1956), through hyperbolic discounting, and Phelps and Pollak (1968) and Pollak 
(1968) advanced the first theoretical frameworks. Later it was refined by Thaler and 
Shefrin (1981) and popularized by Laibson (1997, 1998). Time-inconsistent behavior is 
modelled as a continuing game between current and future self, where the immediate 
future is discounted more strongly relative to the present than two equally distant 
events further in the future. The model has three main features: (a) the addition of a 
present bias parameter δ which discounts the immediate future additionally to the 
standard discount factor β and mimics hyperbolic discounting, (b) the distinction 
between the present bias δ of the current self from the belief about the present bias of 
the future self, denoted by δˆ , and consequently, (c) the distinction between actual 
consumption behavior cj from beliefs about future consumption behavior 1ˆ .jc +  The 
notion of different “selves” with changing preferences allows to model different features 
of individuals and how saving and consumption behavior changes due to these 
characteristics and the sequence of these “selves” with conflicting preferences and 
future beliefs. Because the behavior of these households moves away from traditional 
assumptions but still stems from such causes as monetary or psychic costs of decision 
making, we always refer to these households as time-inconsistent. In specifying future 
beliefs, according to O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) it is possible to distinguish 
between “naïve” and “sophisticated” hyperbolic households. They only differ in their 
own perception of future preferences. While the naïve households believe that their 
future selves will behave in a time-consistent manner although they have consistently 
violated this belief in the past, i.e., ˆ 1δ = , the more sophisticated households correctly 
foresee that their future selves will also behave in a time-inconsistent way, i.e., 
ˆ 1.δ δ= <  Therefore, sophisticated households seek to overcome this misbehavior by 
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constraining their future consumption. We therefore avoid terms such as “rational” and 
“irrational” behavior.  
The current self at age j maximizes the objective function 
{ }1 1ˆmax ( ) ( )j j ju c V zδ β σ + ++ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅  (7) 
by choosing current consumption jc , subject to the budget constraint (equation 5), the 
borrowing constraint (equation 6) and his beliefs 1ˆ ( )jV z +  about the behavior of his 
future selves for the future state 1jz + . The value function ˆ( )V z  for future beliefs is 
computed recursively by 
1 1
ˆ ˆˆ( ) ( ) ( ).j j j jV z u c V zβ σ + += + ⋅ ⋅  (8) 
Note that the present bias δ of the current self does not appear in the value 
computation. His future self who is at age j + 1 will maximize 
{ }1 2 2ˆ ˆˆmax ( ) ( )j j ju c V zδ β σ+ + ++ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅   (9) 
by choosing future consumption 1ˆ jc +  where δ is replaced by δˆ  compared to (7). 
Finally, welfare is computed based on the actual behavior of households: 
1( ) ( ) ( ).j j j jV z u c V zβ σ += + ⋅ ⋅  (10) 
Preferences are time inconsistent because the present-bias parameters δ and δˆ
appear in the decision problems (7) and (9) but not in the calculation of the value 
functions (8) and (10). Sophisticated hyperbolic consumers (where ˆ 1δ δ= < ) behave 
differently compared to time-consistent consumers (where ˆ 1δ δ= = ). For naïve 
hyperbolic consumers (where δ < 1 and ˆ 1δ = ), however, the decision rules and the 
respective value functions of current and future selves do not coincide (Fehr et al. 
2008; Imrohoroglu et al. 2003). 
As Börsch–Supan, Härtl, and Leite (2016) show, both sophisticated and naïve 
hyperbolic households exhibit overconsumption in the beginning of life relative to  
time-consistent households (Figure 3). The simulation model is based on an interest 
rate r and discount rate ρ equal to 3% on an annual basis. θ is set to 2. Survival rates 
are taken from the Human Mortality Database. The benchmark is δ = 0.6. Lower values 
of δ exhibit more severe present bias while higher values denote moderate bias closer 
to a time-consistent behavior. Simulations with and without a PAYB-DB pension 
system with a replacement rate of 60% for each of the three household types (naïve 
hyperbolic, sophisticated hyperbolic, and time-consistent) are shown. 
As seen above, given the existence of present bias, sophisticated hyperbolic 
households consume more than time-consistent households in order to constrain their 
time-inconsistent future selves. Naïve hyperbolic households also consume more  
but they do not realize that this higher consumption in earlier periods will reduce 
substantially their consumption in the future. They therefore overconsume until later 
ages than the sophisticated hyperbolic households and experience a sudden decline in 
consumption. Moreover, the lower δ, the smaller the consumption level in future 
periods since impatience leads households to be eager to consume the most possible 
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in the present (not shown in the graphs). The distinction between naïve and 
sophisticated hyperbolic households becomes stronger for high present bias (low δ).  
Figure 3: Consumption Profiles for Present Bias 60%  
with and without a PAYG Pension System 
 
PAYG = pay-as-you-go; SocSec = social security. 
Source: Computations from Börsch–Supan, Härtl, and Leite (2016). 
Asset profiles therefore show undersaving for sophisticated and naïve hyperbolic 
households. The more short-sighted households are, the more prevalent is 
undersaving. Figure 4 also shows the extent of crowding out of private saving by the 
PAYG pension system, which is considerably stronger among sophisticated and naïve 
hyperbolic households than among time-consistent households. This crowding out 
effect also increases with the extent of present bias. 
Figure 4: Asset Profiles for Present Bias of 60%  
with and without a PAYG Pension System 
 
PAYG = pay-as-you-go; SocSec = social security. 
Source: Computations from Börsch–Supan, Härtl and Leite (2016). 
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Finally, Table 1 computes welfare for each type of household with and without a  
PAYG-financed pension system, expressed as consumption equivalent variation. We 
assume an interest rate of 3%. A PAYG-DB system yields higher welfare than no 
pension system in most cases of Table 1. This holds even for low internal rates of 
return if the present bias is high. The highlighted numbers show the opposite case in 
which present bias and PAYG rates of return are low. 
For a present bias of 0.6, a PAYG-DB pension system improves welfare for the 
sophisticated hyperbolic households if its internal rate of return is larger than 0.9%.  
For the time-consistent households, the internal rate of return must exceed 2.1% to 
improve the households’ welfare vis-à-vis private saving at a 3% interest rate.  
For extreme short-sighted naïve and sophisticated hyperbolic households, welfare is 
always higher for any internal rate of return compared to a private saving scenario. The 
welfare gain of annuitization, however, is much larger for naïve hyperbolic households 
than for time-consistent or sophisticated hyperbolic households, and it increases with 
the extent of present bias. Note that for very high levels of present bias (δ = 0.1), 
welfare is very low without a pension system due to very low consumption levels  
in old-age. 
Table 1: Welfare for each Type of Household 
 
No PAYG  
(%) 
PAYG-DB pension system with IRR= (%) 
 
1% 2% 2.5% 3% 
 
Full Model – Present bias high = 0.1 
Naive hyperbolic –97.86 –8.29 –3.61 –1.70 Baseline 
Sophisticated hyp. –52.42 –8.28 –3.62 –1.68 Baseline 
Time consistent –3.44 –8.26 –3.60 –1.68 Baseline 
 
Full Model – Present bias = 0.6 
Naive hyperbolic –8.81 –8.28 –3.60 –1.68 Baseline 
Sophisticated hyp. –8.03 –8.28 –3.59 –1.69 Baseline 
Time consistent –3.44 –8.26 –3.60 –1.68 Baseline 
 
Full Model – Present bias low = 0.85 
Naive hyperbolic –3.61 –8.27 –3.58 –1.67 Baseline 
Sophisticated hyp. –3.75 –8.28 –3.62 –1.70 Baseline 
Time consistent –3.44 –8.26 –3.60 –1.68 Baseline 
IRR = internal rate of return; PAYG = pay-as-you-go; DB = defined benefit. 
Parameters: rho = r = 3%, theta = 2, replacement rate = 60%.  
Source: Computations from Börsch–Supan, Härtl and Leite (2016). 
3. DIVERSIFICATION OF RETIREMENT SAVINGS WHEN 
HOUSEHOLDS ARE TIME-INCONSISTENT 
We now leave the microeconomic perspective and take a macroeconomic view. An 
important argument in favor of fully funded pension systems for countries with a 
strongly aging population is that the assets can be invested in countries which have a 
less pronounced aging process while pay-as-you-go-financed pension system depend 
on the size and productivity of the domestic work force. Earlier research has 
demonstrated the beneficial effects of such international diversification (Reisen  
2000; Rios–Rull 2001; Brooks 2003; Börsch–Supan et al. 2006; Attanasio et al.  
2007; Börsch–Supan and Ludwig 2009, 2013; Attanasio et al. 2016). This section 
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investigates whether these results also hold when households are time-inconsistent. 
Specifically, we simulate the size of capital flows and the welfare when the share of 
time-inconsistent households differs between the capital exporting and the capital 
importing countries. We employ several variants of computational general equilibrium 
(CGE) models with an overlapping generations (OLG) structure that permits a 
quantitative assessment of capital flows and their welfare implications.  
We do not model frictions to the capital market and allow for free capital flows across 
countries. This assumption appears to contradict the seminal work by Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) who found a strong positive correlation between a country’s 
investments and savings (for OECD countries) which was interpreted by the literature 
as evidence for lower than perfect capital mobility between countries. Contradicting 
conventional wisdom about free international capital flows, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) 
called this finding “The Feldstein–Horioka Puzzle” and included it in their list of the six 
major puzzles in international macroeconomics. A large follow-up literature tried to 
explain this observation. According to Coakley et al. (1998) and Apergis and Tsoumas 
(2009), the majority of studies in modern literature find theoretical or econometric 
explanations for this effect implying that Feldstein and Horioka’s puzzle does not  
collide with the free capital flow hypothesis. This paper adds another explanation for 
relatively small international capital flows which is based on myopic behavior and/or 
procrastination. 
The following subsection introduces the model. It uses the building blocks from Section 
2 and closes the model with a simple production sector. We then compute the general 
equilibrium for the four countries/country groups introduced in Section 1 (Figure 1) with 
three dimensions of international exchange: First, there is trade in the goods and 
services produced by each country. Second, there are corresponding capital flows 
between countries. Saving and investment decisions are governed by a common global 
interest rate which, via international capital flows, equalizes the return to capital across 
countries. Assets held by households in a country are therefore not necessarily equal 
to the domestic capital stock in that country, nor does saving necessarily equal 
investment in a single country. Third, there is migration which we will treat as 
exogenous such that the international equilibrium is uniquely defined by the world 
interest rate. 
3.1 Model Structure 
The CGE model has four building blocks: demography, household behavior, pension 
system, and production sector.  
Demography is described by the initial size of each cohort and the survival of that 
cohort. In the notation below, we abstract from migration although in our simulations we 
add the historical average of net migration as a constant to population size. Let Nt,j 
denote the number of individuals of age j at time t. They were born in year c = t-j and 
are the survivors of the original birth cohort Nc,0: 
Nt,j = σt,j ⋅ Nc,0.  (11) 
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Here σt,j denotes the unconditional probability to survive until age j which will be in year 
t. The original cohort size for cohort c depends on the fertility of women aged k at time 
c = t–j: 
,0 , ,
0
.c c k c k
k
N f N
∞
=
= ⋅∑ 1  (12) 
Population aging has therefore three demographic components which differ 
significantly across countries: past and future increases of longevity, expressed by σt,j; 
the historical transition from babyboom to babybust expressed by past changes of ft,k; 
and fertility below replacement in many countries expressed by current and future low 
levels of ft,k. 
We treat all three demographic forces as exogenous. The actual data are the medium 
variants of the long-term population forecasts provided by the Human Mortality 
Database (EU3 and US) and the 2012 UN Population Trends (Japan and Asia2). 
Households are the decision units. They enter economic life at an age which we  
denote by j=0 and have a finite life span defined by the high mortality at very old age. 
This generates the OLG structure of the CGE model which is essential for modeling 
pension issues. 
The second building block is household behavior. The benchmark model is described 
in Subsection 2.1. We first set δ = 1 and apply the dynamic budget constraint 
(equation 5) but do not impose a borrowing constraint. We then deviate from this 
neoclassical set-up and model households which are time inconsistent due to present 
bias and procrastination as described in equations (7) through (10). 
Parameters used are: discount factor β = 0.99, coefficient of relative risk aversion θ = 2, 
and consumption share parameter φ = 0.6. The benchmark value for the degree of 
present bias in the second set-up is δ = 0.7. 
The third building block is the PAYG-DB pension system. Revenue in year t is the 
product of the contribution rate τt, the average labor income lt,j wt and the number of 
workers NWt defined as: 
,
0
,
R
t t j
j
NW N
=
= ∑  (13) 
where R denotes the retirement age. Expenditure in year t is the product of the average 
pension benefit pt and the number of pensioners NPt defined as: 
,
1
.t t j
j R
NP N
∞
= +
= ∑   (14) 
This results in the PAYG budget equation: 
, , ,
0 1
.
R
t t j t t j t t j
j j R
l w N p Nτ
∞
= = +
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅∑ ∑  (15) 
1  We use the convenience of an infinite summation to avoid the assumption of a fixed time of death. The 
notation does not imply agents with infinite lifespans. Since σt,j and fc,k become very small for j>100 and 
k>50, resp., Nt,j is zero for large j and all sums in this chapter are finite. 
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The PAYG system is of the defined benefit type where a cohort of retirees is promised 
a pension benefit pt defined by a replacement rate q0 which is independent from the 
demographic and macroeconomic environment, pt = q0·wt. The contribution rate to the 
system must then be adjusted up or down to keep the PAYG-DB system balanced 
such that current workers cover the demographic risk for the benefit of the retirees: 
τt = q0 ⋅ NPt / NWt. (16) 
As described in the introduction, the size of the PAYG-DB pension systems is very 
different across the four countries/country groups. Table 2 shows this, expressed as 
the replacement rate q0: 
Table 2: Replacement Rate of PAYG-DB Pension Systems 
France 60% 
Germany 60% 
Italy 70% 
Japan 60% 
US 30% 
PRC 10% 
India 10% 
PAYG = pay-as-you-go; DB = defined benefit; US = United States; PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
The fourth building block which closes the CGE model is the production sector of 
country i. It consists of a representative firm that uses a Cobb–Douglas production 
function given by 
𝑌𝑡,𝑖 = 𝐹�𝐴𝑡,𝑖,𝐾𝑡,𝑖, 𝐿𝑡,𝑖� = 𝐾𝑡,𝑖𝛼 (𝐴𝑡,𝑖𝐿𝑡,𝑖)1−𝛼,  (17) 
where 𝐾𝑡,𝑖 denotes the capital stock and 𝐿𝑡,𝑖 is aggregate labor volume in country i at 
time t. α denotes the capital share (set to 33%) and At,i the technology level of country i 
which is assumed to grow at an exogenous rate g which is assumed to be equal  
(1.5% p.a.) for all countries.2 The initial technology levels At,i are calibrated to reflect 
GDP per capita at the year 2005 and assume as benchmark the US technology level, 
see Table 3: 
The firm’s problem is static such that wages and the rate of return rates are given by 
𝑤𝑡,𝑖 = 𝐴𝑡,𝑖(1 − 𝛼)𝑘𝑡𝛼,  (18) 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝛼𝑘𝑡𝛼−1 − Δ,  (19) 
where kt is the capital stock per productivity weighted unit of labor and Δ is the 
depreciation rate of productive capital, set to 5%. 
  
2  Börsch–Supan and Ludwig (2009) show the effect of different growth rates on returns. In this paper, we 
want to focus on the joint effects of demography and pension systems and therefore keep productivity 
growth fixed at a common level. 
12 
 
                                               
ADBI Working Paper 708 Börsch-Supan, Härtl, and Leite 
 
Table 3: Initial Technology Levels (Calibrated for 2005) 
France 0.93 
Germany 0.96 
Italy 0.62 
Japan 1.33 
US 1.00 
PRC 0.025 
India 0.017 
US = United States; PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
The solution of the CGE model is given by a set of equilibrium conditions. The outcome 
variables are sequences of disaggregate variables on the household level 
, , , , , ,{ ,  ,  }t j i t j i t j ic l a , sequences of aggregate quantities , ,{ ,  }t i t iL K  and prices for labor 
, ,{ ,  }t i t iw τ  on the country level, where the difference between the net and the gross 
wage is defined by the contribution rate to the pension system, and a sequence of 
interest rates { }tr  on the global level. Given the initial capital stocks K0,i in each 
country, the general equilibrium of the world economy is obtained when households 
maximize their life-time utility subject to the constraints given by the two model 
variants, factor prices equal their marginal productivities, the PAYG-DB pension 
systems satisfy the balancing condition, and all markets clear in every country and 
every period: 
, , , , ,
0
t i t j i t j i
j
L l N
∞
=
= ∑ for all t,i , (20) 
1, 1, 1, , ,
1 1 0
,
I I
t i t j i t j i
i i j
K a N
∞
+ + +
= = =
=∑ ∑∑  (21) 
( )1, , , , 1, , , , ,
1 0 1 1 1
( ) 1
I I I I
t j i t j i t i t i t i t i t i
i j i i i
c N K K A L Kα α
∞
−
+
= = = = =
+ = − − ∆∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  (22) 
This CGE model has to be solved numerically. Our time line has four periods: a  
phase-in period, a calibration period, a projection period, and a phase-out period.  
First, we start calculations 110 years before the calibration period begins with the 
assumption of an “artificial” initial steady state in 1850. The time period between 1960 
and 2005 is then used as calibration period in order to determine the structural 
parameters of the model. Our projections run from 2005 until 2050.3 
We determine the equilibrium path of the overlapping generations model by using  
the modified Gauss–Seidel iteration as described in Ludwig (2007). The algorithm 
searches for equilibrium paths of capital to output ratios, and, in case there are social 
security systems, pension contribution rates in each country. 
3  For technical reasons, the model then runs further during a transition to a steady-state population in 
2150 and an additional 100-year period until the model reaches its final steady state in 2250. 
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3.2 Conventional Model of Time-consistent Households 
The baseline path assumes time-consistent behavior in all model countries. It 
continues the historical status quo around the year 2015. The subsequent trajectory is 
then determined by two exogenous forces: First, the general equilibrium is driven by 
population aging modelled as an increase in the survival rates σt,j and a decrease in  
the fertility rates ft,j. Note that demographic change occurs both during the life-cycle  
of each household and across cohorts of different households. Demographic change  
is most vividly expressed as the change in the support ratios depicted in Figure 1. 
Second, a constant replacement rate increases the contribution rate in the four 
countries/country groups’ PAYG-DB pension systems according to equation (13). This 
in turn depresses labor supply and household saving. Since the pension systems have 
very different sizes as displayed in Table 2, effects vary greatly across the four 
countries/country groups. 
To have a first glimpse of the impact of demography without the effect of the pension 
systems, Figure 5 isolates the demographic effect. In order to do so, we set the 
replacement rate in all countries to 30% (as opposed to the values in Table 2). We use 
consumption per capita as an indicator of living standards. 
Figure 5: Baseline Consumption per Capita, Detrended, Demographic Effect Only 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Consumption per capita follows the trend of the support ratio (Figure 1), but the  
relative decline is smaller since increasing wages and decreasing returns induce 
capital–labor substitution offsetting some of the effects of a declining support ratio. 
Hence, GDP per capita will decline less than the support ratio. Furthermore, some  
of households’ savings flow from the more aging countries to less aging countries. 
These savings will eventually be repatriated and will then increase consumption per 
capita stronger than per capita GDP. These two effects are described in detail in 
Börsch–Supan et al. (2014). 
Figure 6 adds the effect of vastly different PAYG-DB pension systems. This figure 
differs notably from Figure 5 since the PRC and India have very small PAYG-DB 
systems effects (smaller than assumed in Figure 5) while they are large in Japan and 
the EU3 countries (larger than assumed in Figure 5). Relatively to the US (same as in 
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Figure 5), per capita consumption in the PRC and India suffers less from the effects of 
population aging while in Japan and the EU3 countries it suffers more. 
Figure 6: Baseline Consumption per Capita, Detrended, Total Effect 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Figure 7 shows the burden of the large PAYG-DB systems in another metric. It 
compares the global market interest rate with the internal rate of return of the PAYG-
DB pension systems which is calculated by setting the expected present discounted 
value of the life-time contributions paid by a cohort c equal to the expected present 
discounted value of the life-time pension benefits received by that cohort: 
, ,
0 1
(1/ (1 )) (1/ (1 )) .
R
j j
c j c j c j j c c j c j j c
j j R
w irr p irrτ σ σ
∞
+ + + + +
= = +
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + = ⋅ ⋅ +∑ ∑   (23) 
If wages grow at a constant rate g, if the relative number of workers grows at a 
constant rate n, and if the replacement rate is defined by the DB rule in equation (13), 
then the internal rate of return of the PAYG-DB system is roughly equal to the growth 
rate of the labor force n plus the growth rate of wages g experienced during the 
lifespan of this cohort: 
irr = g + n.  (24) 
The large and negative growth rate of the labor force n in Japan is reflected in the fast 
decrease of the Japanese internal rate of return of the PAYG-DB system. It also 
decreases quickly in the PRC and India, due to the rapid decline in their support ratios, 
only Japan fares worse. Such a significant decrease has, nevertheless, much less 
effect on per capita consumption than in Japan because the PRC’s and India’s pension 
systems are so small that their effect is mostly overcome by the capital–labor 
substitution effects referred to above. 
  
15 
 
ADBI Working Paper 708 Börsch-Supan, Härtl, and Leite 
 
Figure 7: Global Market Rate of Interest and Internal Rate of Return  
of PAYG-DB Pension Systems 
 
PAYG = pay-as-you-go; DB = defined benefit; IRR = internal rate of return; US = United States; 
EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
In this paper, we are especially interested in the implications for global capital flows. 
Figure 8 shows the net investment position of the four countries/country groups and 
how they change in the course of population aging. Net investment positions are 
calculated as: 
𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑡 = ∑ 𝑎𝑗,𝑡,𝑖 − 𝐾𝑡,𝑖.∞𝑗=1   (25) 
Figure 8: International Investment Position 
 
GDP = gross domestic product; US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
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Japan has large outflows, which have increased in the past to a first peak around this 
time. With the retirement of the early baby boomers, some of that capital is repatriated 
until those savings of the secondary baby boom which are invested abroad and then 
repatriated exhibit a similar up and down movement. The EU3 countries have a later 
baby boom and thus a later repatriation phase. They also start from a lower level of 
outflows. The PRC and India follow a path of steadily increasing investments abroad, 
while the US with its large GDP receives the foreign investments. This role is strongly 
declining in the period after 2045 when Europe and Japan repatriate their assets. 
3.3 International Diversification when Households  
are Present-biased 
The second variant of our macro model assumes the saving behavior of present-biased 
households as described in Subsection 2.3. We first assume that all countries feature 
the same extent of present bias; to be specific, in all countries the share of  
time-consistent households is 20%, while 80% have a present-bias parameter δ = 0.7. 
As we have seen in Section 2, the latter type of households saves substantially less. 
As a consequence, international capital flows, computed as 
𝑐𝑓𝑡,𝑖 = 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡,𝑖 − 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡,𝑖,  (26) 
where 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡,𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑗,𝑡,𝑖 − ∑ 𝑎𝑗,𝑡−1,𝑖 ∞𝑗=1∞𝑗=1  and 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡,𝑖 = 𝐾𝑡,𝑖 − 𝐾𝑡−1,𝑖, 
are smaller than in the model with time-consistent households; see Figure 9. In 
contrast to Figure 8, we have normalized all capital flows to begin with zero in 2015 in 
order to isolate the difference between time-consistent and present-biased households 
in the effect of population aging on capital flows. This normalization removes the 
differences in the levels of the net positions between the model with time-consistent 
households and the model with present-biased households. The solid lines labeled with 
“tc” refer to the model with time-consistent households while the broken lines labeled 
with “pb” refer to the model with present-biased households. 
Figure 9: International Capital Flows, Time-consistent,  
and Present-biased Households 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
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As we can observe in the figure above, there is an increment of inflows compared to 
outflows in the most aging blocks (EU3 and Japan). Asia2 faces growing outflows in 
the time range presented while the US has a more stable behavior as it will only face 
growing outflows later on when it starts to become the youngest region. Comparing 
both scenarios, as already advanced, capital flows are smaller, and we observe this 
through the shift of the lines downwards (lower expansion of outflows) or upwards 
(small increase on inflows). 
Figures 10 and 11 show the relative welfare gains and losses of households between a 
scenario where each country/country group has a higher or lower share of present-
biased agents. These gains and losses are created already in 2015 by different shares 
of present-biased agents in the economy and are then affected by population aging. 
Gains and losses are computed as the life-time consumption-equivalent variation 
(CEV) of a cohort of a specific type in a scenario in which present-biased households 
represent a share of 80% in the total population, compared to a scenario in which 
present-biased households represent only 20% of the population. A positive value 
means that households of a cohort entering the labor market at the given time in the 
first scenario (80% share of present-biased households) are better off than their 
equivalents in the second scenario (20% share of present-biased households). Since 
we cannot compare different types of individuals, we compare time-consistent 
households in Figure 10 and present-biased households in Figure 11. 
Figure 10: Relative Welfare Gains and Losses Due to Population Aging  
– Time-consistent Households 
 
CEV = consumption-equivalent variation; US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Concerning time-consistent households, CEV is positive for all countries until around 
2020. In Japan and the EU3 countries, only cohorts born after 2000 (entering the labor 
market after 2020) are worse off when there is a higher share of present-biased 
agents. For example, in 2015 one has to pay 3% of life-time consumption to a time-
consistent household in the Asia2 countries, assuming that the share of present-biased 
households is 20%, to make him as well off as in a hypothetical situation in which 80% 
of households are present-biased. There are several mechanisms explaining this 
result. The interest rate is higher under a higher share of present-biased agents than in 
the case of lower share. Hence, countries with smaller pension systems benefit more 
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from higher returns on savings. Second, the pattern of CEV over time depends on 
demographics. Countries with large pension systems will at some point have a big 
burden of contributions that may overcome the positive effect of the interest rate due to 
increasing contribution rates and negative labor effects over time in all countries. 
Figure 11: Relative Welfare Gains and Losses Due to Population  
Aging – Present-biased Households 
 
CEV = consumption-equivalent variation; US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
In Figure 11, we compare present-biased households between a scenario where in the 
economy present-biased households represent only a 20% share of total population 
and a scenario where they represent 80% of the population. CEV is positive for all 
countries until around 2020. In EU3, only cohorts born after 2000 (entering the labor 
market after 2020) are worse off when there is a lower share of present-biased 
individuals. As for Japan, it happens some years later, around 2040. Besides the 
interest rate mechanism explained above, the demographic mechanism is here more 
relevant for time-consistent agents making them worse off earlier than the present-
biased counterpart. Of course, countries with large pension systems will be the ones 
with the highest burden that overcomes the positive effect of the rates of return.  
We finally investigate the sensitivity of international capital flows when the share of 
hyperbolically discounting households is asymmetric across countries. We model three 
asymmetric scenarios. All countries have a mix of time-consistent and present-biased 
households. As a baseline assumption, in all scenarios countries/country groups have 
a 20% share of present biased households while (a) the Asian countries, (b) the EU3 
countries, and (c) the US have a share of 80% present-biased households. Figures 12 
through 14 present the resulting capital flows. 
  
19 
 
ADBI Working Paper 708 Börsch-Supan, Härtl, and Leite 
 
Figure 12: International Capital Flows when Asia has a Higher Share  
of Present-biased Households 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Figure 13: International Capital Flows when EU3 has a Higher Share  
of Present-biased Households 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Since households who are time-consistent save dramatically more than present-biased 
households, the capital flows react very sensitively to asymmetric shares of present-
biased households. The three figures clearly reflect which country is saving more than 
the other countries. Note that when Asia or the EU3 countries save relatively little  
due to their high share of hyperbolically discounting households (Figures 12 and 13),  
the US assumes the role of a capital exporting nation. This is of course reversed  
in Figure 14. All figures present the same pattern over time that indicates the 
demographic shift in these countries. EU3 and Japan are clearly the country group with 
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a faster aging which propels them to negative capital flows (increasing inflows) due to 
repatriation of capital, while Asia2 and the US are still presenting relatively growing 
outflows due to their younger population. Moreover, since Asia2 and the US have high 
savings due to small pension systems, it takes longer to have the effect of aging strong 
enough to make it decline (years of decline are not shown in these graphs). 
Figure 14: International Capital Flows when US has a Higher Share  
of Present-biased Households 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Figure 15: Consumption per Capita when Asia has a Higher Share  
of Present-biased Households 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
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The implications for per-capita consumption are depicted in Figures 15 through 17. 
They reflect that a country with more present-biased households will experience a 
relatively larger decline in consumption per capita. These effects are large in all three 
country groups. For instance, in Figure 15, Asia2 has a sharp decline, bigger than in 
the US – they cross around the year 2050.  
Figure 16: Consumption per Capita when EU3 has a Higher Share  
of Present-biased Households 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Figure 17: Consumption per Capita when US has a Higher Share  
of Present-biased Households 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
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The reason behind this larger decline when the majority of agents are present-biased is 
the balance between higher returns on savings (via interest rate) but lower savings due 
to present-bias. Present-biased agents save less and although consumption may 
increase via higher consumption shares, the interest rate effect is diluted and so there 
are lower assets accumulated that benefit from a higher rate of return – savings do not 
dampen the negative effects of aging as they did before. Therefore, the overall effect is 
a consumption per capita decline. 
4. GLOBAL SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF PENSION  
AND LABOR MARKET REFORM 
In Europe, parametric pension and labor market reform has been on the agenda since 
the 1990s in order to relieve some of the restrictions on labor markets. This increase of 
labor supply is supposed to offset the decline of the demographic support ratio in the 
course of population aging. The change in the high school and university system all 
across the EU starting in 2001 (the so-called Bologna process) is expected to decrease 
duration in schooling by about 2 years. In Germany, the so-called Hartz reforms 
announced in 2002 have dramatically reduced unemployment to a level which may be 
regarded as the long-term stable rate of unemployment. 4  Moreover, the German 
parliament decided in 2007 to gradually increase the statutory retirement age from 
65 to 67 years until the year 2029. The French government increased the pensionable 
age of 60 to 62 in 2010. In Italy, the Monti-government 2011–2013 abolished several 
labor market restrictions and advanced the scheduled increase of the retirement age 
and abolished several pathways to early retirement. All three EU3 countries have 
experienced a strong increase in female labor force participation, partially due to 
improvements of the ability to combine job and family. 
In this section, we demonstrate the international effects of a prototypical reform 
package that is motivated by these historical interventions. The key parameters to be 
changed are: 
• An increase in the retirement age by 2 years; 
• A decrease in the job entry age by 2 years; 
• Convergence of female labor force participation to 90% of the rate for men; 
• A reduction in unemployment to 4%. 
All four parametric reform steps will together be phased in linearly between 2005 and 
2050 in our EU3 model economies. We assume that labor supply is exogenous and 
abstract from “backlash” effects described by Börsch–Supan et al. (2014). Hence, the 
reforms increase labor supply to their full extent. Otherwise, the set-up is exactly the 
one of Section 3 with the four countries/country groups – US, EU3, Japan, and Asia2. 
The main focus of this section is not on the effects of the reform on the EU3 
economies, but on international spillovers.5 Moreover, we want to understand whether 
these spillover effects are sensitive to the share of hyperbolically discounting 
households. 
4  Defined as the rate of unemployment that prevents inflation from accelerating (NAIRU, Ball and  
Mankiw 2002). 
5  Cf. Börsch–Supan and Ludwig (2009). 
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4.1 Effects on Europe 
The effects of reforms, which add additional labor supply to the European economies, 
have been described earlier (Börsch–Supan et al. 2014). The decline in the total labor 
volume due to population aging in the EU3 economies is offset by more than a  
half through the labor supply reform. In addition, saving and investment react to the 
parametric reform, leading to an increase in the domestic capital stock relative to a 
baseline scenario without reform. Since both factors of production increase, the effect 
of the reform package on GDP per capita is larger than the increase in employment. 
Since increasing labor also increases aggregate savings, some of households’ savings 
flow from the aging EU3 countries abroad. As we have seen in Section 3, these 
savings will eventually be repatriated and will then increase consumption per capita 
stronger than per capita GDP. Therefore, when normalizing capital flows to 0% in  
2015, the additional savings in the EU3 countries diminish capital inflow to Europe  
(see Figures 21–23, blue lines). This mostly happens after the year 2040 because  
the gradual shift in labor supply takes some time to substantially affect accumulated 
life-cycle savings. Moreover, the reform leads to an increase in the market interest rate 
because every unit of capital is getting more productive when more labor becomes 
available. The higher interest rate is especially beneficial for savers and allows them to 
increase their consumption further. 
The overall effect is visible in Figure 18 where the thick lines represent EU3. Solid lines 
are pre-reform, broken lines after the labor supply reform. Rather than declining by 
17%, consumption per capita only declines by about 8%; the reform thus offsets about 
half of population aging. The reform propels the EU3 countries from resembling Japan 
to resembling the US. This effect is not very sensitive to the fraction of hyperbolically 
discounting households in Europe or abroad (Figures 19 and 20). There is still a slightly 
larger effect in the scenario where the EU3 countries exhibit the largest share of 
hyperbolics. Instead of an increase of 8.5 percentage points in the all-time consistent-
scenario, there is an increase of roughly 9 percentage points when the EU3 countries 
are mostly hyperbolic. The exogenous increase in labor supply and therefore labor 
income is most beneficial for hyperbolics because they consume a larger fraction of 
their income. 
The negative effect of population aging on per capita consumption, however, itself is 
slightly stronger when a large fraction of Europeans has present bias. The reason is 
lower savings under time-inconsistency: savings can no longer serve as a buffer 
against aging effects in Europe by investing them abroad.  
4.2 Effects on Asia 
The spillover effects to the other countries are small but visible in Figures 18–20. They 
amount to about 1 percentage point of annual consumption. These positive spillover 
effects work through the interest rate channel: a higher labor force in Europe slightly 
increases the world interest rate because every unit of capital is getting more 
productive when there is more labor input. The higher interest rate, in turn, is beneficial 
for all countries, which is why they are all slightly better off in terms of consumption  
per capita.  
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The presence of hyperbolic consumers increases the interest rate because of lower 
savings at all times. This changes the path of consumption similar to what we have 
seen in Section 3. The spillover effects after the labor market reform, however, are 
similar in the two asymmetric scenarios, here defined as either a low (20%) or a high 
(80%) share of present-biased households. 
Figure 18: Reform Effects on Consumption per Capita, All Time-consistent 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Figure 19: Reform Effects on Consumption per Capita,  
More Hyperbolics in Asia than in EU3 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
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Figure 20: Reform Effects on Consumption per Capita,  
Fewer Hyperbolics in Asia than in EU3 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Finally, Figures 21 through 23 show the effect of the labor market reform in EU3 on 
international capital flows. Direct investments of the EU3 countries increase especially 
after 2040 due to the reform. The reason is, as mentioned before, the slow shift in  
the reform and its lag on life-cycle savings in Europe. Taking a mirror image to the  
EU3 countries, all the other countries show a decrease in outflows (increase of inflows  
in case of Japan) following the reform. Again, mirroring the development in Europe 
(see Section 4.1), the decrease in capital outflows is higher in the two hyperbolic 
scenarios after the labor market reform.  
Figure 21: Reform Effects on Capital Flows, All Time-consistent 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
26 
 
ADBI Working Paper 708 Börsch-Supan, Härtl, and Leite 
 
Figure 22: Reform Effects on Capital Flows,  
More Hyperbolics in Asia than in EU3 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Figure 23: Reform Effects on Capital Flows,  
Fewer Hyperbolics in Asia than in EU3 
 
US = United States; EU = European Union. 
Source: Own computations. 
Regarding welfare, there is a common pattern in all scenarios (not shown). Cohorts 
entering the labor market before 2005 are better off than in the no labor market-reform 
scenario; cohorts entering afterwards are slightly worse off. The reason is the increase 
of the interest rate because of the reform: cohorts that are already old and possess 
much savings profit a lot from a higher interest rate; young cohorts that may even go 
into debt are worse off if they face a higher interest rate early in life. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Pension economics has traditionally guided pension policy with the help of formal 
models based on individuals who think in a life cycle context with perfect foresight, full 
information, and in a time-consistent manner. This paper sheds light on selected 
aspects of pension economics when these assumptions do not hold. We focus on three 
aspects which are particularly relevant for the quickly aging Asian economies: the 
volume of savings for old-age provisions, international diversification of retirement 
savings, and global spillover effects of pension reforms. 
Regarding the first aspect, we conclude that saving behavior is quite different from the 
textbook model when a substantial fraction of households is myopic or procrastinating 
with hyperbolic time preferences. The volume of savings for old-age provision is 
substantially lower in a world with many myopic households. This has repercussions on 
the interest rate and economic growth but also on the relative merits of pay-as-you-go 
versus fully funded pension systems. 
Second, international capital flows are substantially lower when households are 
present-biased since they are saving dramatically less. We observed that asset 
markets play an important role in a world of aging populations. The logic of this is 
obvious because labor is becoming scarce. There are, however, two further reasons. 
Firstly, capital investments are the only way of distributing resources over time and 
between generations. More specifically, in the case of the demographic shift, capital 
investments are the vehicle that allows part of the earning power of baby-boomers to 
be used to finance their own pension instead of allowing the entire pension to be 
financed by those of the next generation, who will be completely overwhelmed because 
of their greatly reduced numbers. We therefore need a capital market so that the 
earning power of the younger generation is not overwhelmed by the excessive 
demands of the older generation. 
The second reason lies in the international mobility of capital. As we know, mobility of 
the factor labor is not particularly good and aging countries cannot expect that younger 
countries will help to finance their pay-as-you-go systems, nor is it likely that a surge of 
migrants will pay their pension contributions. Capital, in contrast, can move around the 
globe and bring in earnings from countries abroad where labor is more plentiful than it 
is here. For “old countries” such as Germany, Italy, and Japan in particular, an open 
and globalized world can be of assistance during the aging process. Rich in 
consumers, poor in labor, these countries must have an intrinsic interest in boosting 
their imports. Free trading relations are therefore a substitute for inward migration. The 
capital invested abroad provides better production possibilities abroad and generates 
capital income for the retirees at home. 
Regarding the third and final aspect of this paper, parametric labor market and pension 
reforms in one part of the world (Europe) will have global spillover effects through the 
global interest rate. Changes in key labor market and pension parameters, especially 
retirement age, in Europe also improve the sustainability of pension systems and 
economic growth in Asia. 
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